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I. Introduction
Recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued revised enforcement guidelines that could have significant implications
for law firms and other professional organizations.' Specifically, the guide-
lines may increase the likelihood that partners will sue their firms under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) if their firm maintains a
policy that forces them to retire at a certain age.2 Firms that are wary of this
risk can greatly reduce their potential liability by reassessing certain policies."
Conversely, individuals who attain partner status should recognize that their
position within the firm significantly affects their legal rights.
Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 for the purposes of promoting the
"employment of older persons" and prohibiting "arbitrary age discrimination
in employment."4 The Act protects individuals in an employment relationship
who are at least forty years of age.' In enacting it as a sister statute to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress incorporated Title VII's substantive
prohibitions verbatim into the ADEA. 6 Moreover, because both statutes have
similar purposes and provisions, cases interpreting the language of one are
persuasive authority for interpretation of the other.7 When it passed Title VII,
Congress also created the EEOC to serve as the main administrative and
enforcement agency of the Act! Eventually, the EEOC also assumed admin-
istrative and enforcement power over the ADEA.9
1. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-I[I(AXIXd) (May 12, 2000) (addressing federal
employment discrimination law coverage of "partners, officers, members of boards of directors,
and major shareholders").
2. See Martha Neil, Subjective Status: EEOC Rules May Make an 'Employee' Out of
a Law Firm Partner, and Open the Door to Discrimination Suits, A.B.A J., July 2001, at 42,
43 (speculating on potential of more partners bringing suits against law firms).
3. See id. at 42 (cautioning that revised EEOC standards may force firms to reconsider
mandatory retirement policies).
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
5. See id. § 63 1(a) (setting age limits for application of Act).
6. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (noting that "the prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII").
7. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussing nearly identical provisions and purposes in Title VII, Fair Labor Standards Act, and
ADEA).
8. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994) (creating
EEOC and defining enforcement powers).
9. See Exec. Order No. 12,106, 44 Fed. Reg. 1053 (Dec. 28, 1978) (transferring all
ADEA administrative and enforcement functions vested in Secretary of Labor or Civil Service
Commission to EEOC).
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The ADEA and Title VII speak only in terms of unlawful employment
practices, so courts accordingly have interpreted the plain language of the Act
as applying solely to individuals who are "employees."' ° As a result, the
lower federal courts and the EEOC recognize an exemption for bona fide
partners, members of boards of directors, and major shareholders who do not
qualify as "employees."" Instead, these individuals qualify as "employers"
who own and manage a business, thereby falling outside the scope of federal
protection. 2 In addition, the ADEA specifically states that nothing in its
provisions prohibits compulsory retirement of "[b]ona fide executives and
high policymakers" to whom the firm promises certain minimal retirement
benefits. 3 Consequently, although mandating the retirement of employees
such as law firm associates and "of counsel" is illegal under federal age
discrimination law, requiring a bona fide partner to do so is not.'4
For a number of years, however, courts have struggled to define exactly
who is an employee/non-partner and who is a bona fide employer/partner
under the Acts.' 5 This is due to the fact that courts now generally accept that
simply labeling a person "partner" will not allow a firm to avoid the Acts'
prohibitions.' 6 Therefore, liability hinges on defining "employee" for the
purposes of the statute in question. 7
10. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1994) (referring
only to age discrimination in employment context); Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796 (concluding that
plain reading of ADEA indicates that protection extends only to individuals in direct employ-
ment relationship with employer).
11. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 264 (10th Cir. 1987) (commenting on
reluctance of courts to extend statutory employee protections to general partners); EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-MII (May 12, 2000) (explaining that "partners, officers, members of
boards of directors, or major shareholders" generally are not employees).
12. See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797 (reasoning that "their unique status as business owners
and managers" dictates that true partners are not employees).
13. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1994) (isting
requirements for exemption qualification).
14. See Neil, supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that compulsory retirement for partners is
legal because they do not fall within scope of federal protection); Alan Ross Haguewood, Note,
Gray Power in the Gray Area Between Employer and Employee: The Applicability of the
ADEA to Members of Limited Liability Companies, 51 VAD. L. REv. 429,438 (1998) (noting
that courts generally agree that bona fide partners are not protected by ADEA).
15. See Haguewood, supra note 14, at 436 (commenting that failure of Congress to pro-
vide workable definition has resulted in great deal of litigation).
16. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that status
determination cannot rest solely on basis of what partnership calls or declines to call a person).
The Serapion court stated that "partnerships cannot exclude individuals from the protection of
Title VII simply by draping them in grandiose titles which convey little or no substance." Id.
17. See Haguewood, supra note 14, at 436 (explaining that ADEA definition of "em-
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The text of both Title VII and the ADEA offers no practical guidance, as
it provides merely a circular definition of "employee.' 8 Under both Acts,
"the term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer."'1 9 The
definition of "employer" under both statutes is not circular, but is equally
unhelpful: "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce. 20  In
response, the lower federal courts have developed an assortment of tests that
can yield different results on similar facts.21 The net effect is a body of case
law that varies markedly among the federal circuits.2 2 As a result, it is diffi-
cult for firms and individuals to predict how courts in different jurisdictions
will view mandatory retirement policies that apply to all of a firm's offices,
regardless of location.
This Note examines how the revised EEOC enforcement guidelines may
lend clarity to the issue of who receives protection under federal age discrimi-
nation law. In approaching the issue, this Note analyzes the effect of the
revised guidelines on two levels. On a theoretical level, it addresses how the
EEOC finally may have given courts a uniform and workable framework for
determining who is an employee.' On a pragmatic level, it cautions that law
firms, other professional organizations, and individuals who work within them
should assess how the guidelines pertain to their everyday professional lives. 24
Part II of this Note begins with a survey of the various ways in which the
federal courts deal with application of the ADEA exemption.25 It traces the
ployee" determines whom Act protects).
18. See id. (noting that "statute itself offers courts no guidance: it defines 'employee' in
circular fashion").
19. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994); Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994).
20. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994); Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
21. See Haguewood, supra note 14, at 436 (discussing how courts have employed
different tests to reach different results on nearly identical facts).
22. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997) (endorsing totality
of circumstances approach); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (1 1th
Cir. 1991) (applying economic realities test by looking at "concepts of management, control,
and ownership"); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (extend-
ing per se rule that all partners are not employees to shareholders of professional corporation).
23. See infra Part m (summarizing revised guidelines and discussing their significance
and limitations); see also EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-M(AXIXd) (May 12,2000) (provid-
ing clear list of factors to consider with regard to federal protection of individuals).
24. See infra Part VI (offering recommendations for firms in light of revised guidelines);
infra Part VII (arguing that individuals in firms should consider how guidelines might affect
their ADEA status).
25. See infra Part i (discussing judicial approaches to ADEA exemption).
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federal circuits' evolving approach to the problem, beginning with a per se
rule that "labeled" partners do not receive protection under federal employ-
ment discrimination law and culminating with the most recent approach,
which considers the totality of the circumstances in reference to the exemp-
tion.26 Part III explores the effect of the revised EEOC enforcement guide-
lines on this area of the law as well as the potential implications they bring to
law firms and other professional organizations.2 Part IV analyzes the legal
authority of EEOC guidelines generally and the degree of deference courts
accord them. Part V surveys several hypothetical situations that illustrate
the possible effects of the revised guidelines.29 Part VI offers recommenda-
tions that can help firms avoid liability through policy changes and protective
measures.3 ° Finally, Part VII concludes by arguing that the revised guidelines,
although not dispositive, are an effective device for courts, employers, and
employees to utilize in educating themselves about the scope of federal age
discrimination protection."
I. Judicial Approaches to the ADEA Exemption
The lower federal courts have used four main approaches in determining
who is an employee for the purposes of the ADEA. A bright-line per se rule
that partners are not employees under federal employment discrimination law
dominated early litigation of the issue." Courts later adopted an "economic
realities" test that focuses on the degree to which an individual is economi-
cally dependent on the business in question and analyzes the business relation-
ship from a common-law agency perspective.33 More recent decisions illus-
26. See infra Part I (outlining four main judicial approaches to ADEA exemption).
27. See infra Part M (discussing significance and limitations of revised guidelines).
28. See infra Part IV (examining legal authority of EEOC guidelines within courts of law
generally).
29. See infra Part V (offering hypothetical examples of how revised guidelines might
affect status determinations).
30. See infra Part VI (providing suggestions to minimize liability under revised EEOC
guidelines).
31. See infra Part VII (concluding that revised guidelines provide useful guidance in
determining scope of federal age protection).
32. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that partners'
ownership and management of partnership categorically precludes them from obtaining Title
VII "employee" status); see also EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178-79 (7th
Cir. 1984) (applying per se rule of Burke in finding that shareholders of professional corpora-
tion cannot be employees).
33. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271 (10th Cir. 1987) (examining whether
individual is economically dependent on business to which he renders service). Other commen-
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trate an "organizational form" test that bases the application of the ADEA
exemption on the choice of form in which the business operates. 4 The final
approach distinguishes between employee and partner on a case-by-case basis
by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
5
A. The Per Se Rule
In Burke v. Friedman,36 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
endorsed a per se rule for determining employee status.37  Under this ap-
proach, individuals with the title of "partner" are not employees under federal
employment discrimination law.38 Burke considered whether partners in a
business association count towards the fifteen-employee threshold require-
ment for "employers" subject to Title VII.3 9 The Seventh Circuit first looked
tators note an approach that I will not discuss in any detail. See Randall J. Gingiss, Partners
as Common-Law Employees, 28 IND. L. REV. 21, 21-22 (1994) (arguing that "entity" theory of
partnership may make partners common-law employees under agency rationale). An extensive
review of the common law as it applies to modem-day employment discrimination statutes is
beyond the scope of this project I have chosen the four approaches that I believe are the most
widely accepted and relevant to my policy goals. The economic realities test that I will later
discuss encompasses the common-law arguments that are relevant to this Note. In addition, I
will discuss common-law arguments as they apply to the revised EEOC guidelines.
34. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1540 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
presumption that director/shareholders in professional corporation are employees under
ADEA).
35. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997) (endorsing "totality of
the circumstances" test in which court primarily considers individual's degree of "ownership,
remuneration, and management").
36. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
37. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming district court's
order to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because defendant was not "employer"
under Title VII). In Burke, the court addressed the issue of whether a business's partners count
towards the fifteen-employee threshold required for actions against "employers" arising under
Title VII. Id. at 868. Burke alleged that the public accounting firm for which she worked
discriminated against her because of her sex. Id. The district court found that plaintiff's
complaint lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the firm consisted of four partners and
thirteen non-partners. Id. at 868-69. Accordingly, the firm lacked the requisite fifteen employ-
ees necessary to be an "employer" under Title VII. Id. Plaintiff asserted that the partners in the
firm counted towards the total because they were also "employees" within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 869. The Seventh Circuit concluded that an individual is either a partner or an
employee, but is never both. Id. As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 870.
38. See id. (refusing to regard partners as employees because partners manage business
and share in profits and losses).
39. See id. at 868 (discussing whether partnership met Title VII fifteen-employee
threshold).
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to the terms of Title VII and the definition of "partnership" under the Uniform
Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA).4° Reasoning that the management of the
business and the ability to share in profits and losses are central characteristics
distinguishing partners from employees, the court concluded that a partner
cannot also be an "employee" for Title VII purposes. Thus, the court affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
41
The Seventh Circuit later reiterated this position and expanded the rule's
scope, finding firms acting as professional corporations analogous to tradi-
tional partnerships and thus subject to the same conceptual dichotomy.42 The
per se rule centers on the notion that the roles of partners and employees are
by nature mutually exclusive and are thus distinct concepts in light of Title
VII.' The rule possibly reflects a presumption that partners direct the busi-
ness while employees provide the business with services. Indeed, the Burke
court used self-evident language when it stated that it could "not see how
partners can be regarded as employees rather than as employers who own and
manage the operation of the business. "44
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not directly ad-
dressed the issue, one leading case does appear to qualify the per se rule. In
Hishon v. King & Spalding,4 a majority of the Court concluded that Title VII
protection may extend to the selection of partners because the opportunity to
attain partnership status is usually a "term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment" in a firm. 4' The Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding passed over
40. See id. at 869 (discussing Title VII definition of "employee" as "'individual' em-
ployed by an employer" and UPA definition of partnership as "association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit").
41. Id. at 869-70.
42. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no
reason to treat shareholders in professional corporation differently under Title VII than partners
in partnership).
43. See Leigh Pokora, Comment, Partners as Employees Under Tide M.7: The Saga
Continues, 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 249,256 (1995) (discussing Justice Powell's concurrence in
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
44. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867,869 (7th Cir. 1977).
45. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
46. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 (1984) (finding petitioner's claim
for sexual discrimination during partnership selection process cognizable under Title VII). In
Hishon, the Court considered whether a complaint alleging that a law firm discriminated under
Title VII against a female associate when it declined to make her a partner must fail for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 71. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that
Title VII did not "apply to the selection of partners by a partnership." Id. at 72-73. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the United
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associate Elizabeth Hishon for partnership and ultimately terminated her
employment. ' She brought suit under Title VII, claiming that her denial was
based on prohibited sex discrimination.4 Hishon sought "declaratory and
injunctive relief, backpay, and compensatory damages 'in lieu of reinstate-
ment and promotion to partnership."'49 The district court dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that Title VII did not apply to the
selection of partners, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. °
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that Hishon
had various cognizable claims under Title VII."' However, by resting its
decision on '"rm, condition, or privilege" of employment grounds, the Court
avoided the broader issue of whether partners may qualify as employees under
certain circumstances."2 Despite this narrower ground, the case foreshadowed
later shifts in this area of the law by arguably facilitating the development of
more liberal tests for application of the ADEA exemption. Justice Powell's
Hishon concurrence, in particular, emphasized that the relationship among
partners is not an "employment" relationship for the purposes of Title VII."
Although Powell stressed that the relationship between partnership and
partner "differs markedly from that between employer and employee - includ-
ing that between the partnership and its associates," 4 he did remark in a
States granted certioran. Id. at 73. The Court noted that once an employment relationship
becomes contractual, Title VII's provisions govern the "terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." Id. at 74. Consideration for partnership, if part of the employment contract, is
clearly such a benefit and thus falls within the scope of Title VII. Id. at 75. In addition,
independent from any express or implied contractual right, an employer may provide employees
with benefits that qualify as "privileges" of employment under Title VII. Id. Therefore, the
Court concluded that I-Iishon stated a cognizable claim under Title VIL and the Court reversed
and remanded for the development of facts that would indicate whether the partnership consid-
eration was a term, condition, or privilege of an associate's employment at respondent's firm.
Id. at 75, 78-79.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 72-73.
51. See id. at 78-79 (concluding that petitioner deserved "her day in court to prove her
allegations").
52. See Gingiss, supra note 33, at 31 (noting that because Hishon was associate, Supreme
Court never addressed whether there are circumstances under which partners could be employ-
ees); Haguewood, supra note 14, at 440 (noting that Supreme Court in Hishon did not address
question of whether partners can ever qualify as employees).
53. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that opinion does not
extend Title VII to "the relationship among partners").
54. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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footnote that "an employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by
labeling its employees as 'partners.' ' 5 As a result, courts and commentators
have interpreted Powell's concurrence in two ways. Some have used the
opinion to justify the line of cases denying partners the right to seek redress
under federal employment discrimination statutes, 6 while others have relied
on the language in footnote two of the concurrence to support the argument
that, in certain contexts, partners are de facto employees. 7
B. The Economic Realities Test
Although Hishon's effect on the issue of partners as employees is debat-
able, it is clear that courts gradually began to take a more sophisticated view
of the partnership-employee relationship. For example, in Wheeler v. Hurd-
man,5" the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to
apply the formalistic per se rule and instead extended the "economic realities"
test.59 As its name implies, the test focuses on the actual pecuniary relationship
between the business and the putative employee." Originally, courts devel-
oped the economic realities test to distinguish between employees and inde-
pendent contractors for the purposes of applying social legislation such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).6' The key question under the test is
55. Id. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207,215 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that some courts use Justice Powell's concurrence to support rigid distinction between
partners and employees); Haguewood, supra note 14, at 440 (arguing that Justice Powell "vali-
dated the partnership exemption for federal employment discrimination laws").
57. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982,987 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Justice Powell's
concurrence as authority for looking beyond label that partnership places on person); Caruso
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that Justice
Powell's concurrence provides support for rejection of per se rule).
58. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
59. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271 (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting position that
"economic realities test is categorically inapplicable to partnerships"). In Wheeler, the court
addressed the issue of whether federal employment discrimination laws may apply to a plaintiff
who was a general partner in a general partnership. Id. at 258. The district court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and certified the question
of coverage under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act for immediate appeal. Id. The
Tenth Circuit ultimately reversed on appeal, but noted that its commitment to use of an eco-
nomic realities test in "applying remedial social economic legislation" warranted application of
the test on these facts. Id. at 277. However, applying a version of the economic realities test
to the plaintiff, the court concluded that the district court erred in characterizing her as an
employee. Id. at 276-77. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 277.
60. See Haguewood, supra note 14, at 450 (describing economic realities test).
61. See Christopher J. Henderson, Comment, Employment Discrimination - Wheeler v.
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"whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he
renders service."62
Joined bythe EEOC, plaint Marilyn Wheeler argued that the economic
realities test should extend to federal employment discrimination statutes
because the remedial goals of the legislation were to end discrimination in the
workplace in sweeping fashion.' As a result, the provisions of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act should apply in all situations in which discrimi-
nation may arise in a business setting.' The court declined to take such a broad
view of the Acts, pointing out that Congress specifically chose to limit each
statute's reach to employment practices.' However, the court did examine the
appropriateness of a modified economic realities test in certain situations in
which the inquiry may disclose that a partner is not truly bona fide under the
provisions ofthe Acts.66 Under this test, relevant factors include the following:
"(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker;
(2) the worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in
the business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; and (5) the
degree of skill required to perform the work."'6 Applying these factors, the
court concluded that there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff was not
a bona fide partner."
Wheeler reflected a willingness by at least one court to examine more
closely the relationship between title and entitlement. The Tenth Circuit
conceded that absolutes in this area ofthe law are difficult to sustain.69 Signifi-
cantly, the court treated Wheeler's claim as both a threshold jurisdictional
question and one of substantive rights, thereby implying that such a claim
could have merit under the right circumstances.
70
Hurdman - Who's the Boss? Partners as Employees Under Federal Employment Discrimina-
tion Laws, 13 . CoRP. L. 1159, 1163-64 (1988) (discussing development of economic realities
test).
62. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 271 (quoting Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722-23 (10th Cir.
1984)).
63. See id. at 269,275 (discussing plaintiff's and EEOC's policy arguments).
64. See id. at 275 (discussing plaintiff's and EEOC's argument that Acts should cover any
individual susceptible to discrimination).
65. See id. at 275-76 (noting that Congress limited scope of statutes to employment situa-
tions).
66. See id. at 277 (noting that there may be circumstances in which economic realities test
factors indicate that purported partnership is not bona fide).
67. Id. at271.
68. See id. at 277 (distinguishing plaintiff's work environment from that of normal
corporate employee).
69. Id. at 268.
70. See id. at 259 (addressing nature of motion under review).
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1. Common-Law Agency Analysis as an Element of Economic Reality
Implicit in the economic realities test is a common-law agency inquiry
that evaluates the degree of control the organization exercises over the indi-
vidual." Determining the degree of control is important, on the theory that
"[e]mployees in the traditional employer-employee relationship are more
vulnerable than partners in a partnership are to abuses.""2 An employer with
the power to control (as the principal) under agency law has the power to
dictate the terms and conditions of the employee's work (as the agent).73
The Wheeler court followed the modern trend of choosing not to focus
on the distinction between "master" and "servant" that is found in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency." 4 Nevertheless, the court discussed the inequality
of bargaining power that can exist when an individual is dependent on a
business.7" Thus, although the master-servant terminology has largely fallen
from courts' use, contemporary employer-employee relationships continue to
raise vulnerability concerns. Specifically, employees are not in the same
position as bona fide partners to "self-police" the employment atmosphere; an
employee generally has no ability to direct the working environment.' This
contrasts with the situation of a bona fide partner, who maintains a position
of power among the other partners." A partnership arrangement assumes that
decisions are made through the consent of the partners.7" Partners, at least in
theory, would never agree to a condition that would hurt them personally at
some point in the future. 9 Given these presumptions, a common-law agency
analysis used together with the economic realities test may help to expose
cases in which a "partner" is actually more like an employee.
71. See id. at 268-69 (discussing plaintiffs characterization of test, which focused on
organization's domination of individual).
72. See Robertson v. Alexander Grant & Co., 798 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1986) (pointing
to vulnerability employees face due to lack of control over pension benefits).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1958) (recognizing principal's right
to control conduct of agent regarding matters entrusted to agent).
74. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268 n.24 (IOth Cir. 1987) (noting Supreme
Court's decision to reject tests found in definition of "servant" in Restatement).
75. See id. at 269 n.25 (describing control of employment opportunities as linchpin of
economic realities test).
76. See Robertson, 798 F.2d at 870-71 (discussing inherent "self-policing" nature of
partnerships).
77. See id. at 870 (explaining self-policing function present in partnerships).
78. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell J., concurring)
(explaining that essence of partnership rests on notions of shared enterprise, common agree-
ment, and universal consent).
79. See Robertson v. Alexander Grant & Co., 798 F.2d 868, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1986)
(noting incentive among partners not to agree to potentially harmful provisions).
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2. Criticism of the Economic Realities Test
As the Wheeler court noted, the economic realities test is not without its
limitations."0 Focusing on economic dependence with regard to traditional
independent contractors (such as construction workers) makes sense because
courts in those situations are distinguishing between individuals who are
actually part of a business (employees) and those who are running a separate
business (independent contractors). In contrast, when a court uses the test in
reference to individuals acting in a partnership setting, the court's focus on
economic dependence is arguably neither useful nor appropriate."2
The nature of a professional partnership implies that even bona fide
partners largely depend on the business for economic viability, and in no way
raises the question whether they are in business for themselves. 3 On the
contrary, a partnership by definition represents a conscious decision by a group
of individuals to increase their economic potential through a joint venture "to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit. '84 Therefore, courts are under-
standably wary of applying a test that disregards a central feature of partnership
dynamics.
8 5
Viewing attorneys as independent contractors outside of the purely
economic sense is appropriate, as I will later discuss.8 6 However, in narrow
terms of economic dependence, the analogy to independent contractors is more
tenuous.87 Criticism such as this illustrates why courts and scholars in address-
ing the scope of federal employment discrimination statutes continue to search
for paradigms beyond the economic realities test.
C. The Organizational Form Test
The rise of alternative business forms to the traditional general partnership
offers external limited liability for contemporary professionals.88 Lawyers,
80. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271-75 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting shortcom-
ings of economic realities test as applied to partnerships).
81. See id. (discussing use of economic realities test in context of distinguishing employ-
ees from independent contractors).
82. See id. at 272 (illustrating difficulty of using economic dependence inquiry to distin-
guish among people who are part of same enterprise).
83. See id. (noting that no partner is fully independent of partnership).
84. Uniform Partnership Act § 101(6) (1997).
85. See Pokora, supra note 43, at 258 (noting that economic realities test has gained more
support in legal commentaries than it has in courtrooms).
86. See infra Part ll.B (discussing focus on "independence" and "control" in revised
EEOC guidelines).
87. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257,272 (10th Cir. 1987) (deeming independent
contractor/employee factors useless in general partnership setting).
88. See James M. Crippando, Don't Take It Personally - Limited Liability for Attorney
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doctors, accountants, and other professionals may significantly decrease
liability exposure for their colleagues' actions by organizing themselves in
arrangements such as professional corporations."" The beneficial aspects of
this innovative form, however, have perhaps led some of its proponents to
overlook the unfavorable internal liability implications that it may carry.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has ruled that organizations that choose to act as professional corporations
forfeit the right to assert the ADEA partnership exemption with regard to
directors/shareholders.9 ° In EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc.,91 the court
rejected the argument of the defendant, a private corporation, that it was
exempt from the ADEA on a theory that directors/shareholders are analogous
to partners.' Johnson & Higgins appealed the district court's decision to
grant partial summary judgment in favor of the EEOC, based on the court's
determination that the firm's mandatory retirement policy for directors at age
sixty or sixty-two violated the ADEA.'
On appeal, the court relied on a prior Second Circuit decision that limited
the partnership exemption to dejure partnerships.94 Although recognizing that
modem partnerships and closely held corporations are fairly indistinguishable
in terms of their organization and operation, the Johnson & Higgins court
rigidly adhered to a "choice of form" test.9" Viewing the roles of corporate
director/shareholder and partner as mutually exclusive under the ADEA, the
court found no way to extend the partnership exemption to a corporate enter-
prise.' Under the Johnson & Higgins holding, once an organization makes
the decision to incorporate, it cannot then argue that it is exempt from the
ADEA on a theory that it is a de facto partnership.'
Shareholders Under Florida's Professional Service Corporation Act, 15 FA. ST. U. L. REV.
279, 282 (1987) (commenting on limited liability regime for professionals under Florida
Professional Service Corporation Act).
89. See Hagucwood, supra note 14, at 432-35 (summarizing advent of hybrid corporate
form).
90. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986)
(treating decision to incorporate as dispositive).
91. 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
92. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1537-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (ana-
lyzing theory of directors as employees under ADEA).
93. See id. at 1531 (summarizing case's procedural posture).
94. See id. at 1537 (noting court's previous refusal to extend partnership exemption to
closely held corporations and other organizations) (citing Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797)).
95. See id. at 1537-39 (refusing to disregard incorporated form).
96. See id. at 1538 (refusing to recognize circumstances in which shareholders are
concurrently partners).
97. See id. at 1537-38 (characterizing Hyland as good law and summarizing its implica-
tions).
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Although Johnson & Higgins does prevent professional corporations
from asserting the partnership exemption, it does not stand for the proposition
that directors/shareholders in a professional corporation are always employees
under the ADEA. 98 According to the court, common-law agency analysis
reveals whether a director possesses attributes that make him or her an "em-
ployee" for the purposes of federal employment discrimination law." As a
result, professional corporations may still rely on an ADEA exemption in
regard to directors, so long as the individual is not also an "employee" within
the meaning of the Act. °0 The court cited a three-factor modification of the
common-law agency test that examines the following: "(1) whether the
director has undertaken traditional employee duties; (2) whether the director
was regularly employed by a separate entity; and (3) whether the director
reported to someone higher in the hierarchy."'' The directors at Johnson &
Higgins met these criteria mainly because they continued their duties as senior
officers or managers in the firm following their selection as directors."°
The Johnson & Higgins case is significant because the court recognized
a distinction between the duties that an individual's title implies and that
individual's actual responsibilities within a business organization.0 3 In doing
so, the court went one step further than did the Wheeler court because it
examined not only the fiscal realities of certain business relationships, but also
the multi-faceted role that individuals frequently play within modem alterna-
tive business forms."' Notably, the court maintained that the finn could claim
privilege to the ADEA exemption only "by severing the link between the
individual's employee status and his director status."' 5 When contrasted with
the bright-line per se rule in Burke, Johnson & Higgins laid a foundation for
judicial approaches that transcend mere labeling and the rigid partner-em-
ployee dichotomy.
D. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Just as the lines between partner and employee have become blurred by
modem business arrangements, so too have the parameters of the previous tests
I have discussed. The developing case law and scholarship surrounding this
98. See id. at 1539 (clarifying holding in Hyland).
99. See id. at 1538-39 (explaining alternate grounds by which professional corporations
may assert ADEA exemption).
100. See id. at 1538 (discussing what circumstances may give rise to classifying director
as employee).
101. Id. at 1539.
102. See id. (applying common-law agency test to firm's directors).
103. See id. at 1540 (characterizing company's directors as senior-level employees).
104. See id. (focusing on plaintiffs' dual status as employees and directors).
105. Id.
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issue reveal instances in which elements of the different tests overlap.
10 6
Although title is no longer dispositive, courts still consider whether an individ-
ual's title is bona fide while imposing an economic realities test."01 This is
because courts are wary of organizations that may admit individuals into the
partnership solely to avoid the consequences of federal employment discrimi-
nation law."re Similarly, the organizational form of a business plays a role in
the economic reality of a given plaintiff, who is in turn subject to a comnon-
law agency analysis.109 Courts struggle to find the appropriate test to apply,
paying lip service to the various alternatives, but ultimately focusing more on
the underlying ramifications of their decisions."0 Their dilemma, therefore,
is finding a way to render decisions that are both results-oriented and princi-
pled in the sense of maintaining the important conceptual distinctions of
partnership, agency, and employment discrimination law.' Whether a re-
sponse to this complex array of theories or a by-product of it, a "totality of the
circumstances" approach appears to have taken center stage in this debate.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in the case of
Simpson v. Ernst & Young," 2 dealt directly with the issue of whether partners
are "employees" for the purposes of the ADEA.113 Following the merger of
accounting firms Arthur Young & Co. and Ernst & Whinney (now Ernst &
Young), the new firm's Management Committee secretly voted to reduce
"excess staff capacity" by five percent." 4 Simpson and all other similarly
106. See, e.g., id. at 1539 (citing common-law agency test within context of organizational
form analysis); Siko v. Kassab, Archbold & O'Brien, L.L.P., No. CIVA.98-402, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12153, at * 15 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1998) (identifying no definitive test, but listing
thirteen factors to consider); Pokora, supra note 43, at 259 (describing some courts' use of
"hybrid" tests, which combine common-law agency analysis and economic realities test).
107. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting economic
realities test in situations in which plaintiff is bona fide general partner).
108. See id. at 276 (concluding that partnerships are not free to label someone "partner"
in order to avoid application of Acts).
109. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982,987 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that "partnership
cannot exclude individuals from the protection of Title VII simply by draping them in grandiose
titles which carry little or no substance"); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,
1539-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing economic relationship between director and professional
corporation in applying common-law agency analysis).
110. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 269-74 (surveying tests, choosing to apply economic
realities test, but criticizing ramifications of economic realities test if taken to logical extreme).
111. See Pokora, supra note 43, at 272 (advocating case-by-case application of common-
law test as best method for balancing "partner" versus "employee" characteristics).
112. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
113. See Simpson v. Ernst &Young, 100 F.3d432,439(6th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520
U.S. 1248 (1997) (discussing threshold jurisdictional question of plaintiff's coverage under
ADEA).
114. See id. at 440 (summarizing facts leading up to lawsuit).
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situated partners had signed pre-merger agreements that stated that the merger
would not result in major staff reductions and would produce equivalent or
better retirement benefits for all concerned parties."' 5 After the firm termi-
nated him, Simpson brought suit under the ADEA, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), and a supplemental Ohio law that bars age
discrimination." 6 He asserted that the defendant terminated him partly to
deprive him of participation in the firm's new retirement plans."1 7 The district
court found that Simpson was an "employee" under the employment discrimi-
nation statutes, thereby entitling him to appropriate relief 118
In addressing the validity of Simpson's claim, the Sixth Circuit took
particular interest in the firm's management committee." 9 The complex terms
of the partnership agreement created an ambiguous business structure that
effectively divested Simpson and other similarly situated "older" partners of
all meaningful management participation in the firm. 20 Evidence showed that
the ten- to fourteen-member committee exclusively directed "the firm's
business, assets, and affairs. ' 121 Partners who were not committee members
had no authority over such matters as personnel and partnership decisions,
compensation structures and levels, inspection of the firm books and records,
and voting for management committee membership. 22 The court concluded
that partners in Simpson's position had "no bona fide ownership interest, no
fiduciary relationship, no share in the profits and losses, no significant man-
agement control ... and no job security.'
2
The Sixth Circuit seemed more concerned with the equitable result that
the facts demanded than with the formalities of the test it applied, noting the
trial court's finding that Simpson was for all practical purposes "an employee
with the additional detriment of having promised to be liable for the firm's
losses."'' 24 Although acknowledging the existence of various tests, the court
ultimately took a fact-specific approach that relied heavily on factors gleaned
115. See id. (detailing terms of pre-merger documents).
116. See id. at 439 (discussing procedural posture of case).
117. See id. (summarizing relief sought by plaintifi).
118. See id. (discussing result of cross-motions for summary judgment).
119. See id. at 440-41 (remarking on Committee's covert tactics); see also James B. Porter,
Note, Modern Partnership Interests as Securities: The Effect of RUPA, RULPA, and LLP
Statutes on Investment ContractAnabis, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 955,976 (1998) (analyzing
Simpson in light of partnership agreement that plaintiff signed).
120. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 432,441 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing how
plaintiff was subject to near absolute control of committee).
121. See id. (summarizing trial judge's factual findings).
122. See id. (pointing to evidence that plaintiff was employee).
123. See id. at 442 (quoting district court's conclusions).
124. Id.
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from the common-law principles codified in the 1914 UPA.125 Focusing "on
the particular circumstances of the case at hand," the court concluded that
Simpson had a valid age discrimination claim entitling him to relief.26
In Serapion v. Martinez,127 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit also endorsed the totality of the circumstances approach."n
Building on Simpson, the Serapion court provided a framework that focused
on "overlapping categories" of "ownership, remuneration, and manage-
ment."'129 However, as did the Sixth Circuit in Simpson, it warned that its list
was non-exclusive, noting that "status determination under Title VII must be
founded on the totality of the circumstances which pertain to a particular
case. W
13 0
II. The Ripple Effect of Simpson: Revised EEOC Enforcement
Guidelines for Determining Bona Fide Partner Status
Whatever the jurisprudential implications of Simpson may be, many
organizations have found its practical implications difficult to swallow.
Along with Ernst & Young, sixteen major law firms joined as amici curiae in
unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari.' Likely underly-
125. See id. at 443-44 (cautioning that list was not exhaustive).
126. See id. at 443 (endorsing case-by-case approach).
127. 119 F.3d 982 (lst Cir. 1997).
128. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997) (using totality of
circumstances test to determine Title VII status). In Serapion, the First Circuit considered
whether "Title VII's employment-related shelter might in certain circumstances extend" to a law
firm partner. Id. at 984. Margarita Serapion alleged that three of her law farm partners "never
intended that a woman would achieve parity" with her male colleagues, in spite of attaining
partnership status in the firm. Id. at 984-85. When the firm dissolved and reorganized in
response to her refusal to sign an agreement that would have diminished her authority signifi-
cantly, she sued alleging violations of Title VII. Id. at 986. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that Serapion was not an "employee" for
Title VII purposes and was therefore ineligible to seek redress under the Act. Id. On appeal,
the First Circuit cited Simpson and determined that Title VII protection might extend to partners
under the right conditions. Id. at 990. The court noted that the factual circumstances of
particular cases determine the appropriate emphasis placed on each of the three overlapping
categories it fisted. Id. Stressing the factors of "ownership" and "remuneration" in regard to the
plaintiff, the court pointed out that she received an equity interest in the firm and very generous
fringe benefits. Id. at 991. As for the "management" category, she enjoyed significant voting
rights in the firm's two principal governing bodies. Id. Finding that no reasonable fact-finder
could conclude that the plaintiff was not a bona fide partner, the court affirmed the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants. Id.
129. Id. at 990.
130. Id.
131. See Ernst & Young v. Simpson, 520 U.S. 1248,1248 (1997) (granting motion of law
firms for leave to file brief as amici curiae, denying petition for writ of certiorari).
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ing the concern of Ernst & Young and the law firms was a realization that the
lower federal courts have moved toward a more malleable framework that
acknowledges the inequalities within modern professional organizations.'
The hierarchy of large firms today leaves many individuals with relatively
weak bargaining power, thereby unable to "self-police" despite attaining
partner status.133 In a world of seven-to-ten-year "up or out"'134 partnership
tracks, it is very likely that many prospective partners feel pressured to forfeit
some of their rights in exchange for the perceived professional satisfaction
and stability that partner standing brings.1 3 However, as the Simpson court
alluded to, the fact that these individuals still agree to assume liability for the
firm's debts makes for what some might call a "raw deal."" Law finns, other
professional organizations, and prospective partners should realize that these
trends have not gone unnoticed by the EEOC.
As mentioned earlier, the EEOC from time to time has taken a stance in
the courts on the issue of the ADEA status of partners. 137 In addition to
bringing suits and appearing as amicus curiae in the past, the Commission has
expressed its official position in its Compliance Manual, which in turn has
largely reflected the prevailing precedents of the lower federal courts.1
38
However, recently revised EEOC enforcement guidelines take a more pro-
active stance by not only relying on precedent but also attempting to shape
policies in their own right.'39 Through the guidelines, the EEOC for the first
132. See Dawn S. Sherman, Partners Suing the Partnership: Are Courts Correctly
Deciding Who Is an Employer and Who Is an Employee Under Title VII?, 6 WL & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 645, 659-62 (2000) (discussing policies underlying recent decisions).
133. See Porter, supra note 119, at 975 (suggesting that inferior bargaining power may
explain why prospective partners agree to partnership agreements that deny them many
traditional aspects of partner status).
134. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the Human Capitalists:
An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 313, 315-16 (1985) (explaining "up or out" policies as ones under which associates
either make partner or leave firm involuntarily).
135. See Porter, supra note 119, at 975 (noting how prospective partners feel forced to sign
partnership agreements that strip them of rights).
136. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting district court's
observation that under partnership agreement, plaintiff was not bona fide partner but was liable
for firm's actions).
137. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1537-38 (2d Cir. 1996)
(detailing EEOC's involvement in case); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 258 n.2 (10th Cir.
1987) (explaining granting of permission to EEOC to appear as amicus curiae).
138. See 144 1-98 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 605-E 2179, 2325, 2325 (explaining
that Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon mirrors Commission's position that all aspects of
employer-employee relationship must be considered).
139. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-l(AX6Xa) (May 12,2000) (setting forth criteria
for exemptions from ADEA's prohibition on compulsory retirement).
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time provides a definitive list of attributes that an individual should possess
in order to qualify for the partnership exemption."4 Thus, the Commission
has now made clear both its understanding of precedent and its view as to how
future courts should assess the structure of modem partnerships.
A. Summary and Significance of the Revised Guidelines
In the revised guidelines, the EEOC endorses a totality of the circum-
stances approach that turns on whether an individual is subject to an organiza-
tion's control. 4' If the organization controls the individual, he or she is not
a "partner."' 42 In determining who is subject to such control, the Commission
lists as factors the following:
" Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules
and regulations of the individual's work
" Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the
individual's work
" Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization
* Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence
the organization
" Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as
expressed in written agreements or contracts
" Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of
the organizationM3
In addition to stipulating who is not a "partner," the guidelines provide
another list that prescribes who is an "employee" in the sense that the individ-
ual is in an employment relationship."M The guidelines give no indication of
the relative weight of any of the factors, nor do they require a plaintiff to meet
all or even a majority of the criteria. 4 '
The guidelines go on to discuss expressly the application of the ADEA to
compulsory retirement policies for "bona fide executives and high
140. See id. § 2-UI(AXIXd) (listing factors to consider with regard to coverage of "part-
ners, officers, members of boards of directors, and major shareholders").
141. See id. (discussing application of guidelines to "partners, officers, members of boards
of directors, and major shareholders").
142. See id. (providing that individual is not partner whom organization controls but
instead "employee").
143. Id.
144. See id. § 2-I1I(AXI) (discussing whom Equal Employment Opportunity statutes
protect).
145. See id. (emphasizing that list is not exhaustive). The guidelines state that "the
determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties."
Id.
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policymakers."'46 These individuals are exempt from ADEA protection if the
employer establishes that the individual:
" Manages the organization or a department or subdivision ofthe organi-
zation;
" Directs the work of at least two other employees;
* Has authority to hire or dismiss other employees or his/her suggestions
as to personnel decisions are given particular weight;
• Customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and
• No more than 20 percent of his/her work time (or 40 percent if s/he is
in a retail or service establishment) is devoted to activities unrelated to
those described in requirements I through 4 above .... 147
In light of Johnson & Higgins, the preceding section could have signifi-
cant implications for firms that choose to act as professional corporations.
Specifically, this section points out that executives and high-level
policymakers meeting these requirements are subject to an exemption, so long
as they do not also hold positions within the organization that fall outside that
exemption. 4 If they do hold such positions, the organization may not force
them to retire. 149 As evidenced in Johnson & Higgins, firms that delegate
multiple responsibilities to senior-level members must recognize the potential
liability associated with that type of internal structure.'
All of this indicates that the Commission is taking notice of the movement
towards larger, more centralized firms, even if legally organized as partner-
ships."' For example, the EEOC likely realizes that within the hierarchy of a
700-attorney law firm it is simply unfeasible to allow every partner a voice in
key management decisions." 2 Nor is it practical for the firm to grant every
partner an equity interest in the organization, as indicated by the increase in
two-tiered partnership tracks and other unconventional firm arrangements.
5 3
146. See id. § 2-1ll(A)(6Xa) (providing guidance for applying ADEA exemption for "bona
fide executives and high-level policymakers").
147. Id.
148. See id. (explaining that individual holding two or more positions is still subject to the
exemption if both positions are executive or high policymaking positions).
149. See id. (discussing requirements for ADEA exemption).
150. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1540 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
that firm could claim exemption only by severing link between director status and employee
status).
151. See Neil, supra note 2, at 43 (citing firm size as factor that could encourage EEOC
to treat "partner" as employee).
152. See id. (contrasting management structure of large firms with that of small firms).
153. See Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal
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However, along with these realities comes a responsibility for the firm to
reassess its policies with regard to those partners with less power. 154 Further-
more, if courts choose to view these guidelines deferentially, the EEOC may
have created a tool for evaluating the necessary elements of partner and em-
ployee status. Armed with that tool, the EEOC and prospective plaintiffs may
find it easier to bring suit and ultimately recover damages against organizations
that fail to reconsider their policies.155
B. Potential Limitations of the Revised Guidelines
In spite of the Commission's attempt to clarify its position and shed
clearer light on this issue, the revised guidelines are not without flaws.' 56 The
guidelines take the position that, if an organization controls an individual, then
that individual is not a partner. 57 By failing to offer insight as to how to assess
the listed factors or to assign relative weight to any of them, however, the
EEOC may have created ambiguity in other respects.' The fuzzy distinction
made between one who "acts independently and participates in managing the
organization" and one who is "subject to the organization's control" is typical
of this ambiguity.'59
The EEOC guidelines describe these attributes disjunctively, implying
that they are mutually exclusive.16" If the Commission is referring to "inde-
pendence" and "control" in the agency law sense, the terms are not so cut and
dry. As a preliminary matter, it is clear that attorneys are almost always agents,
but never employees/servants of their clients.' Clients do not physically
Profession: TheAdventof TemporaryLawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359,368-70 (1990)
(discussing law firms' departure from traditional career track through use of "non-equity"
partnership status, "of-counsel" designations, and "staff attorneys").
154. See Neil, supra note 2, at 42 (commenting on need for firms to reassess policies in
light of recent changes in firm structure and EEOC guidelines).
155. See id. (suggesting that revised EEOC guidelines may make it easier for law firm
partner to be classified as employee under ADEA).
156. See id. (describing guidelines as product of EEOC's attempt to make "compliance
manual simpler and easier to understand").
157. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-II(AX1Xd) (May 12,2000) (explaining determi-
nation that EEOC investigator should make).
158. See id. (noting that other factors in relationship between parties may affect determina-
tion).
159. See id. (distinguishing between partners and employees based on degree of control).
160. See id. (noting circumstances where "partners, officers, members of boards of
directors, and major shareholders" will qualify as employees).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (discussing master-servant
relationship); see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED
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control how an attorney does his or her job."2 Instead, attorneys act as inde-
pendent contractors who attempt to follow their clients' wishes but who
ultimately exercise their own professional judgment." Furthermore, under the
"entity theory" adopted by the 1997 UPA, a partnership is an entity capable of
having a separate existence apart from its partners."'
That being established, in a partnership setting a bona fide partner has a
great deal of autonomy in regard to clients and other third parties. The partner
is an agent ofthe partnership as an entity, but also maintains the ability to make
professional decisions free from the influence of the other partners and, in that
sense, is an independent contractor in relation to both the client and the firm. 65
However, the organization as an entity (through the other bona fide partners
acting as the principal) maintains the right to "control" how the partner behaves
by setting standards to abide by when representing the partnership, based on
the partner's ability to bind the organization when the partner acts as its
agent. 66 In addition, the firm may set internal standards, such as minimum
billable hours, to determine partner compensation and bonuses. 67
In contrast, non-partners are independent contractors only in relation to
their clients. Like all attorneys, they possess a sense of professional autonomy
while still acting as agents who respect their clients' wishes.'6" Despite this,
the organization as an entity (through the bona fide partners acting as the
principal) largely dictates the working conditions of a non-partner. 69 This is
Bus]NESsEs AND CLOSELY HELD CoRPOAToNs § 2.6 (1996) (providing example of when
attorney is not agent).
162. See REsTATaMENT (SEcOND) OF AoENCY § 220 (1958) (defining servant as agent
whose "physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to" master's control).
163. See id. § 2(3) (defining independent contractor as "person who contracts with another
to do something but who is not controlled by the other").
164. See Uniform Partnership Act § 201(a) (1997) (defining nature of partnership); see
also Gingiss, supra note 33, at 25-26 (commenting on aggregate versus entity theories of part-
nership).
165. See Uniform Partnership Act § 301(1) (1997) (classifying each partner as agent of
partnership).
166. See id. (providing that acts of partners carried on in ordinary course of partnership
business normally bind partnership).
167. See Edward S. Adams & Stuart Albert, Law Redesigns Law: Legal Principles as
Principles of Law Firm Organization, 51 RuroMs L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1999) (noting that
business-like nature of law firns results in measuring attorney's success by ability to meet
internal performance standards).
168. See Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WK. & MARY L.
REV. 259,267-68 (1985) (analyzing agency-law-based duties that associates owe to clients).
169. See id. at 260-61 (commenting on ability of law firm to give associates assignments
and to direct how and when work is done).
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because the organization, in addition to setting internal standards of behavior,
maintains the right to control a non-partner's physical conduct in the perfor-
mance of his or her job, thus making the non-partner an employee/servant in
relation to the organization itself.70
It is this distinction between a principal's customary right to control any
type of agent in the abstract sense and a principal's more extensive right to
control the physical conduct of an employee/servant that the guidelines fail to
clarify or recognize.' Furthermore, the implication that the attributes of
"independence" and "control" are mutually exclusive represents too simplistic
a view of agency law as it applies to attorneys acting in a partnership setting.7
As I have discussed, all attorneys, whether bona fide partners or not, are both
"independent" and "controlled" on some level. 73  The vague nature of the
guidelines' control-oriented standard potentially could place almost any person
working in a partnership setting within the scope of federal protection.7 The
same criticism applies to the economic realities test, as the Wheeler court
observed. 71 I will clarify these points later in my hypothetical illustrations and
conclusion sections, 76 but for now they will suffice to illustrate the potential
shortcomings of the revised EEOC guidelines.
IV Legal Authority of EEOC Guidelines: Do Courts
View Them Deferentially?
One key issue related to this topic is whether EEOC guidelines generally
carry significant legal weight. In the past, courts addressing the issue of who
receives protection under federal employment discrimination statutes have
170. See id. at 261 (describing associate as agent and servant of law firm, subject to control
of partners); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 220 (1958) (noting master's right
to control servant's physical conduct).
171. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-II(AXIXd) (May 12,2000) (discussing concept
of "control" without clarifying its meaning).
172. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text (analyzing attorney's dual roles as
agent and independent contractor).
173. See Gerry MaloneBalancingAutonomyandAccountability, LAW PRAC. MGM., Oct.
1997, at 22, 23 (discussing how lawyers cling to idea of personal autonomy while recognizing
measure of accountability to others in firm).
174. See Pokora, supra note 43, at 269 (criticizing idea of affording bona fide partners
protection under Title V11).
175. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257,272-73 (10th Cir. 1987) (asserting that under
version of economic realities test proposed by plaintiff and EEOC virtually every partner could
be employee for purposes of discrimination statutes).
176. See infra Parts V and VII (providing hypothetical situations and conclusions in light
of revised enforcement guidelines).
1036 59 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1013 (2002)
pointed to the language of EEOC guidelines, but usually within the context of
citing consistent precedent as well. 7 7 Thus, the ability of the recently revised
guidelines to influence the state ofthe law in this area depends largely upon the
willingness of courts to view them somewhat independently of judicial prece-
dent.
EEOC guidelines are written with the EEOC investigator rather than the
courts in mind. 78 As a result, they take on a tone that is uniquely administra-
tive as opposed to statutory. 17 9 Apart from this, however, the Supreme Court
on more than one occasion has indicated that EEOC guidelines and similar
agency interpretations may carry significant legal authority. 80
A. Cases Showing Deference to EEOC Guidelines and
Similar Agency Interpretations
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,) the Court statedthat EEOC guidelines are
entitled to "great deference."' 2 A group of black employees at Duke Power
Company brought suit under Title VII, alleging unlawful racial discrimination
in the company's employee selection process. 8 3 The employees challenged a
policy that required a high school education and successful performance on
two professionally prepared aptitude tests for hire or promotion to any of the
company's more desirable positions. 8 4 Both the district court and the court of
appeals found that Title VII applied only to purposeful racial discrimination,
and both courts therefore refused to reach the merits of the case.1
8 5
177. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 270 (citing factors from EEOC administrative decision
published in 1985 EEOC Employment Practice Guide); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing standard set forth in 1985 EEOC
Employment Practice Guide).
178. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-m(A)(1)(d) (May 12,2000) (listing factors that
investigator should consider).
179. See id. (defining covered individuals by first asking rhetorical question: "Who is an
'Employee'?").
180. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 121-22 (1988) (deferring
to EEOC's interpretation of Title VII provision); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
434 (1975) (endorsing approach taken by EEOC guidelines); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (noting that EEOC guidelines are "entitled to great deference"), Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (according "great deference" to EEOC guide-
lines).
181. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
182. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,434 (1971) (endorsing EEOC guide-
lines' interpretation of Title VII provisions).
183. See id. at 426 (explaining Title VII's mechanism for class action enforcement suits).
184. See id. at 427-28 (describing company's employment policies and practices).
185. See id. at 428-29 (explaining procedural posture of case and reasoning of lower
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In addressing the issue of Title VII's scope, the Supreme Court first
looked to the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures.' 6 The
Court justified this approach by reasoning that the Commission's enforcement
responsibilities result in the issuance of such guidelines, which effectively
represent the administrative interpretation of Title VII. 7 Notably, the Court
went further and stated that because the legislative history of Title VII sup-
ported the Commission's construction, there was "good reason to treat the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress."'"" By giving the guidelines
considerable deference, the Court went on to reverse the decision of the court
of appeals on the grounds that employee aptitude tests must have a demonstra-
ble relation to the performance of the job.8 9
Gnggs is noteworthy because of the approach the Court used. The case
opened the door for a new theory of discrimination, "disparate impact" (non-
intentional discrimination), in the process giving countless plaintiffs a new
avenue of relief.9 It is telling in itself that the Court's decision turned largely
on the substantive dimensions of EEOC guidelines. However, without ex-
pressly distinguishing Griggs or its progeny, the Court more recently has
tempered its tone with regard to EEOC and administrative guidelines in gen-
eral.'9'
US. v. Mead Corp."7 did not deal with an EEOC guideline, but it did
clarify the Court's general approach to administrative agency interpretations. 93
courts).
186. See id. at 433-34 (characterizing EEOC guidelines as administrative interpretation).
187. See id. (placing guidelines in context of administrative process).
188. Id. at 434.
189. See id. at 436 (explaining ramifications of decision for use of employee tests).
190. See Christopher Dee, Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment
Criteria Under Title VII, 54 U. CHL L. REV. 957,959-61 (1987) (summarizing effect of Griggs
and noting attractiveness of disparate impact claims to plaintiffs). Under the theory of disparate
impact, a plaintiff need not show proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 959-60. A prima facie
case requires only a showing that a particular policy has "a discriminatory effect on members
of a protected class." Id.
191. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (indicating no
heightened deference to agency guideline when Congress did not delegate power to promulgate
rules or regulations); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976) (determining that
EEOC guidelines in question merited little deference).
192. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
193. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (summarizing
holding). In Mead, the Court considered what amount of judicial deference to afford to a tariff
"ruling letter" issued by the Customs Service. Id. at 221,225-26. Ruling letters represent the
"official position of the Customs Service with respect to the particular transaction or issue
described therein." Id. at 222 (internal quotations omitted). Mead Corporation imported small
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The United States Government sought review of a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that gave no deference whatso-
ever to a "ruling letter" issued by the Customs Service."9 In overturning the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court identified varying levels of judicial
deference applicable to administrative agency interpretations.195
The Court reserved the highest level of deference for instances in which
it appears that the agency promulgated an interpretation in exercise of powers
delegated to it by Congress to make rules that carry the force of law." ' This
requires a showing that the agency engaged in formal adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking or that it acted in accordance with some other signal
of comparable congressional intent. In those cases, a reviewing court must
accept the agency's position unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'" However, even if those
circumstances are not present, the agency's interpretation is not automatically
beyond the province of judicial consideration.199
"day planners" into the United States and sought to avoid having them classified as "bound
diaries" under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. Id. at 224-25. Avoiding
the classification would make the items free from any duties, whereas classifying them as such
would subject them to a tariff of four percent Id.
The company filed suit in the Court of International Trade, which ruled for the Govern-
ment without considering the issue of judicial deference. Id. at 225. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Customs classifications
rulings do not fall under the highly-deferential standard announced in the landmark case
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Id. at 226. Finding that the
rulings did not carry the force of law, the court rejected the agency's classification. Id. On
appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out that the majority of its cases applying Chevron-level
deference involved "the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication." Id.
at 230. However, the Court cautioned that administrative formalities were not required elements
of Chevron-level deference. Id. at 231. Instead, courts should focus on congressional intent
and look for circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress wanted to delegate interpreta-
tional authority. Id. The Court found no such indications in this case, but explained that an
administrative agency's interpretation, whatever its form, may merit lower-level ("some,"
"persuasive," etc.) deference given the agency's expertise in certain matters. Id. at 230-32. As
a result, the Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 239.
194. See id. at 226 (discussing procedural posture and lower court's ruling).
195. See id. at 236-37 (recognizing varying levels of judicial deference and rejecting
Justice Scalia's "either-or" approach in dissent).
196. See id. at 226-27 (describing circumstances warranting Chevron-level deference).
197. See id. at 227 (summarizing holding in regard to Chevron-level deference).
198. See id. at 229 (explaining standard for reviewing courts) (quoting Chevron U.SA Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984)).
199. See id. at 232 (cautioning that decision does not preclude courts from according some
deference to agency interpretations).
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Without a clear showing of formal process or comparable action, a court
may view the agency's interpretation with a proportionate level of lowered
deference.2° In light of the agency's expertise, available information, and
prior interpretations, the court may attach an appropriate level of merit to the
position of the agency."' This level of merit could range from according the
agency's position "some deference" to giving it "persuasive force."' 2 Because
the circumstances showed that the Customs Service's ruling letter clearly did
not demand the highest level of deference, but may have deserved some form
of lowered consideration, the Court vacated the judgment of the court of
appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 3
B. Analysis: EEOC Guidelines as Persuasive Authority
EEOC guidelines most appropriately fall within the lowered deference
classification in Mead for three reasons. First, they are not the product of
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.2° Second, there is
no alternate way of gleaning comparable congressional intent to delegate
broad rulemaking power because the Commission primarily is not a
rulemaking agency.0' It is an independent regulatory agency, entrusted
mostly with enforcement of federal employment discrimination laws and the
promotion of employer-employee conciliation efforts.2" Third, although the
Commission primarily is not a rulemaking agency, the text of the ADEA does
specifically enable it to issue rules, regulations, and exemptions necessary or
appropriate for carrying out the Act.2 °' Thus, a decision by the Commission
to issue enforcement guidelines rather than formally update its rules, regula-
tions, or exemptions likely means that the guidelines in question do not carry
200. See id. at 234-35 (discussing circumstances in which courts may give deference below
level of Chevron).
201. See id. (describing framework for courts to consider when faced with interpretation
outside scope of Chevron).
202. See id. at 235-36 (reasoning that multifarious levels of administrative action require
varying degrees of deference).
203. See id. at 238-39 (summarizing ramifications of Court's decision).
204. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (noting that "Congress, in
enacting Title VII did not confer upon EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations
pursuant to that Title").
205. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1994) (defining
authority of EEOC and focusing primarily on enforcement powers).
206. See id. (defining EEOC's enforcement procedures and powers).
207. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1994) (authorizing
EEOC to "issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary and appropriate for
carrying out" the Act).
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the force of law. Conceding these points is a necessary but not sufficient step
in deciding how to assess. appropriately EEOC guidelines in general. 2'
The next step, in light of Mead, is to consider the statutory circumstances
and the breadth of possible agency action.2" Although it is clear that Congress
did not intend to give broad rulemaking power to the EEOC, Congress typically
does not define precisely how it proposes to implement statutes that authorize
administrative action.21 ° Mead stressed the importance of recognizing that
"[implementation of a statute may occur in formal adjudication or the choice
to defend against judicial challenge" or "in a central board or office or in
dozens of enforcement agencies dotted across the country."21 Therefore, it is
fully plausible that in choosing not to grant broad rulemaking power to the
EEOC, Congress nonetheless granted it primary implementation power for
federal employment discrimination acts such as Title VII and the ADEA." 2
The structure of the EEOC lends itself well to this scenario. The Commis-
sion's principal office in Washington, D.C. and its fifty field offices each have
the responsibility of coordinating all federal equal employment opportunity
regulations, practices, and policies for their respective jurisdictions.213
Accordingly, a logical way to view EEOC guidelines is as a legitimate
exercise of the Commission's implementation power. Under the proportional-
ity standard in Mead, this would entitle them to a fairly high level of judicial
deference because the EEOC has a certain degree of implementation expertise
that courts neither possess nor have the power to exercise. 4 Furthermore,
when placed within the breadth of possible EEOC action, implementation falls
relatively high on the spectrum, most likely just behind the Commission's
enforcement power.21' Although the Supreme Court has retreated from the
208. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (noting that whether
agency's interpretation is entitled to Chevron-level deference depends on whether Congress has
given agency rulemaking authority or similar interpretational authority).
209. See id. at 236 (reasoning that "the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action
must be taken into account" in determining appropriate level of deference).
210. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text (describing how EEOC's organic
statute makes no provision for rulemaking activities).
211. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
212. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(gX3) (1994) (granting
EEOC power to provide technical assistance to employers in their efforts to comply with Tide
VII).
213. See id. § 2000e-4(f) (declaring Washington, D.C. as location of EEOC's principal
office, but authorizing Commission to meet or exercise its powers at any other location); see also
"EEOC Enforcement Activities," at http'J/www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html (providing overview of
Commission and its activities) (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
214. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text (describing Mead's proportionality
standard).
215. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (discussing Mead's focus on breadth
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"great deference" standard in Griggs,216 together these factors present a strong
case for viewing EEOC guidelines as persuasive authority deserving of mea-
surable deference by the federal courts.
V Hypothetical Illustrations
Assuming that EEOC guidelines merit at least persuasive force, one way
to gauge how courts may view the revised guidelines is by applying them to
hypothetical situations. The following fictional scenarios emphasize the
attributes that the revised guidelines list for determining bona fide partner
status"" as well as "bona fide executives or high policymakers" status. 21 They
also consider the previously discussed ambiguity in the revised guidelines'
focus on the "right to control.1
219
Example 1
Michael Dimitruk, age sixty-two, carries the title of partner in a large full-
service law firm. The firm has seven offices throughout the United States, with
an approximate total of 500 attorneys. In his office of 125 attorneys, he serves
on the recruitment and hiring committee and the associate development com-
mittee. Michael practices in the real estate section and decides what projects
to work on, but does not head the practice group. He frequently asks associates
to review his work, but the firm does not require him to send his work to any
other partner for approval. The firm determines Michael's compensation
solely on the basis of its net profits. Under the partnership agreement, his
relationship with the firm only terminates voluntarily or for good cause.
Analysis of Example 1
Michael most likely is a bona fide partner. The organization cannot fire
him; it can only terminate his relationship with the firm for good cause.220 He
of agency action and statutory circumstances, as well as significance of EEOC implementation
activities).
216. See supra note 193 (noting post-Griggs Supreme Court declining to give substantial
deference to EEOC guidelines).
217. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-IlI(AX1Xd) (May 12, 2000) (listing factors to
consider in determining "employee" status of "partners, officers, members of boards of directors,
and major shareholders").
218. See id. § 2-Il1(AX6XiXa) (listing requirements for "bona fide executives and high
policymakers").
219. See supra Part M.B (explaining potential limitations of revised enforcement guide-
lines).
220. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-HI(A)(lXd) (May 12, 2000) (listing as factor
organization's ability to hire or fire individual).
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can influence the organization fairly extensively through his committee roles
because they both involve significant decisionmaking.221 He also maintains
general autonomy over his work."22 Although he does report to a superior, the
head of his practice group, his other attributes and the fact that he shares in firm
profits probably outweigh this factor.223 If the firm forces Michael to retire
under these circumstances, it is unlikely that he will have an ADEA claim.
Example 2
Chris Wiech, age forty-one, carries the title of partner in the same office
of the same large full-service law firm for which Michael works. He serves on
the community service committee. Upon making partner one year ago, Chris
entered a "probationary" period during which the firm maintains the right to
terminate him without cause. During this period, he draws a base salary, but
also receives a share ofthe firm's profits for bringing in clients. Following the
end of his probationary period, the firm will decide whether to make him a full
equity partner. Chris practices in the corporate finance section of the firm,
receiving priority projects from higher-level partners. When there are rela-
tively few priority projects or all of them are complete, he may take on projects
of his choosing. Chris works closely with two high-level associates, but he
does not supervise them or approve their work. Instead, they assist him with
the priority projects he receives, which are then subject to approval by the
higher-level partners. If he does not make full equity partner at the end of the
probationary period, the firm will retain him under the same terms and condi-
tions in which he currently operates.
Analysis of Example 2
Chris most likely is not a bona fide partner and is instead an employee.
The organization can fire him without cause224 as well as dictate the parameters
of his work on a number of levels.22 The committee on which he sits may
influence the outside community, but does not have very much internal influ-
ence on the organization itself.226 Chris' lack of supervisory power over the
two associates also reflects his inability to influence the firm.' Although he
221. See id. (listing individual's ability to influence organization as factor).
222. See id. (listing as factor extent to which organization supervises individual's work).
223. See id. (listing as factors whether individual reports to superior and whether individ-
ual shares in organization's profits, losses, and liabilities).
224. See id. (listing as factor organization's ability to hire or fire individual).
225. See id. (listing as factors extent to which organization controls individual's work and
supervises individual).
226. See id. (listing as factor individual's ability to influence organization).
227. See id. (same).
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receives a share of the organization's profits, this figure is proportionate to the
amount of business that he brings to the firm. Therefore, salary remains his
primary source of compensation, as it does with associates in the firm.' Ifthe
firm forces him to retire under these circumstances, he will likely have an
ADEA claim.
Example 3
Mary Bonds, age fifty-six, carries the title of partner in a securities litiga-
tion boutique firm. The firm has one office in New York City with twenty-five
attorneys, ten of whom carry the title of partner. It has a loose management
structure, with no committees or identifiable administration apart from one
attorney with the title of "managing partner." Taking pride in the firm's "team
environment," all of the partners and associates assist each other with cases.
The firm does not divide its practice into specialized sections because it
focuses only on securities litigation. Partners choose cases on the basis of
priority and interest. The firm offers two compensation packages for partners.
Those partners choosing to bill a minimum of 2000 hours per year share
equally in the firm's profits. Alternatively, partners choosing to bill a mini-
mum of 1650 hours per year receive a base salary, with bonuses for every addi-
tional 100 hours billed. Mary has chosen the second compensation package for
the last ten years.
Analysis of Example 3
Mary most likely is a bona fide partner. This hypothetical displays how
firm size is a factor in status determinations.' The firm's non-hierarchical
approach presents a number of ramifications. First, it indicates that despite the
fact that Mary sits on no committees and in no designated management posi-
tion, her influence over the organization is relatively high due to its small
size." In addition, it shows that she effectively reports to no one higher in the
firm. 231 Furthermore, although the other attorneys review her projects, this is
a product of the firm's '"am atmosphere" and not of a rigid supervisory struc-
ture.232 Mary's compensation package represents a deliberate choice by her to
228. See id. (listing as factor individual's share in organization's profits, losses, and
liabilities).
229. See Neil, supra note 2, at 43 (discussing how movement toward larger law firms may
prompt increase in partner discrimination suits).
230. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-IDI(AXIXd) (May 12, 2000) (listing as factor
individual's degree of influence over organization).
231. See id. (listing as factor whether individual reports to superior).
232. See id. (listing as factor extent to which organization supervises individual's work).
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work fewer hours in exchange for lower compensation, as part of a voluntary
agreement with the firm. The agreement does nothing to alter her partner
status; it only provides her with an alternative that she chose to exercise. The
revised guidelines respect this sort of agreement between the parties. 3 If the
firm forces Mary to retire under these circumstances, it is unlikely that she
will have an ADEA claim.
Example 4
William Jowers, age fifty-three, carries the title of director/shareholder
in a mid-size full-service law firm. The firm regards William as a partner;
however, it assigns the label of "director/shareholder" to partners because it
operates as a professional corporation. In addition to his duties as a direc-
tor/shareholder, he serves as the firm's vice president. William practices in
the firm's bankruptcy section. Over the years, his duties as vice president
have taken time away from his law practice. William increasingly spends the
majority of his time dealing with administrative matters for the firm, such as
public relations and charitable activities. The firm determines his compensa-
tion based on a share of its net profits and an annual evaluation by the other
directors/shareholders of his performance as vice president. Two years ago,
the firm's directors created and adopted a manual entitled: "Policies and
Procedures for Attorneys to Follow When Representing the Firm." All
attorneys at the firm, regardless of title, must respect its provisions.
Analysis of Example 4
It is not clear whether William is a bona fide partner or an employee.
This hypothetical demonstrates how a firm's choice of business form can
affect status determinations."4 It also highlights the ambiguous nature of the
"right to control" emphasis of the guidelines." 5 By placing William in the
position of vice president, the firm has forced him to assume duties associated
with an officer in a corporation. Thus, his numerous roles in the firm include
that of a partner, director, shareholder, and officer. Normally, his status as a
director/shareholder would make him exempt from ADEA protection because
233. See id. (placing emphasis on intent of parties as expressed in written agreements or
contracts).
234. See supra Part ll.C (discussing organizational form test used by courts); see also
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1538-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that firm
that organized as private corporation was required to treat directora/shareholders as "employees"
for ADEA purposes).
235. See supra Part MI.B (discussing potential limitations of revised enforcement guide-
lines).
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he would meet the requirements of a bona fide executive or high-level policy
maker .236 The large amount of time William spends in his role as an officer
(vice president), however, may mean that he is devoting more than twenty
percent of his time to activities unrelated to his role as a direc-
tor/shareholder. 37 In addition, these administrative duties probably do not
entail decisions of significant policy or influence.' Assuming the above, he
would not qualify for the ADEA's "bona fide executives and high-level
policymakers" exemption and thus would be protected as an employee." 9
The firm also "controls" William in the abstract sense that it sets manda-
tory standards for him to abide by when representing the partnership.24
However, it may or may not "control" him in the more extensive sense be-
cause it is not clear if and when the firm may physically dictate how he does
his work. In particular, the firm cannot physically control his legal work as
a partner in the bankruptcy section.241 However, the firm very well may
physically control his administrative work as an officer, particularly through
the leverage it maintains through a review-based compensation system. His
multiple roles, along with the guidelines' failure to clarify whether the focus
is on control in the abstract sense or on physical control, leave us questioning
where William's status lies. 242 If the focus is on the former, then he most
likely is an employee.243 If it is the latter, then his status rests on the degree
to which the organization exercises physical control over him.2" Therefore,
236. See EEOC CompL Man. (BNA) § 2-lII(AX6XaXi) (May 12, 2000) (listing require-
ments for "bona fide executives and high policymakers").
237. See id. (mandating that no more than twenty percent of individual's work time apply
to activities not related to management duties as described in previously listed requirements);
see also Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1539-40 (finding that plaintiff directors who devoted
vast majority of time to positions as officers were protected by ADEA because of administrative
nature of work).
238. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-m(A)(6Xa) (May 12, 2000) (requiring that
individual "regularly exercise [] discretionary powers" to qualify for bona fide executive
exemption of ADEA).
239. See id. (describing criteria for ADEA exemption for "bona fide executives and high-
level policymakers").
240. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71 (discussing distinction between principal's
right to control partners in abstract sense and right to control non-partners in physical sense).
241. See supra accompanying note 165 (characterizing partners as independent contractors
in relation to firm partnership).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74 (noting guidelines' failure to define what
type of control determination turns on).
243. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-M(AXIXd) (May 12, 2000) (providing that
individual who is subject to organization's control is employee).
244. See id. (same).
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if the firm forces William to retire under these circumstances, it is difficult to
conclude whether he will have an ADEA claim.
The preceding hypothetical examples illustrate how the totality of the
circumstances affects outcomes under the revised guidelines.2 45 Although no
single factor is determinative or necessarily carries greater weight, 2 46 the extent
to which a few factors exist can shape an individual's status. With this in mind,
firms have several ways to minimize the likelihood of employer liability.
VI. Recommendations for Avoiding Employer Liability
The revised guidelines place responsibility in the hands of firms to avoid
policies that arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of age or, alternatively, to take
steps to shelter themselves from liability. The simplest, yet least attractive,
option for firms is to cease all compulsory retirement practices regardless of
status. Alternatively, firms could abolish all two-tiered partnership tracks,
giving all partners an equity interest, a say in key management decisions, and
autonomy over their work.247 Given the logical improbability that firms will
want to exercise these options and the impracticalities of doing so, Congress
has provided them with an effective avenue for protection.
In 1990, Congress passed the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA) as an amendment to the ADEA.24 Unlike the provisions of Title
VII, the OWBPA specifically allows for waiver of ADEA rights, provided that
the waiver meets certain requirements. 9 Waiver commonly occurs at the
severance stage of an employment relationship, and the general rule is that
individuals may not prospectively waive their rights under the federal employ-
ment discrimination acts.' The OWBPA's waiver provisions also address
this issue, requiring that an agreement may not waive any rights or claims that
may arise after execution of the waiver." However, the Code of Federal
245. See supra text accompanying note 141 (characterizing approach taken by revised
guidelines as totality of circumstances approach).
246. See supra text accompanying note 145 (noting revised guidelines' failure to address
relative weight of factors).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 221-23 (hypothesizing that individual with role
in management, autonomy over work, and equity stake in firm is bona fide partner under
ADEA).
248. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433,104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1994)).
249. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994) (outlining
requirements for waiver ofADEA rights).
250. See Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining
extension of Title VII prohibition on prospective waiver to ADEA).
251. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(IXC) (1994) (barring
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Regulations explicitly maintains that these provisions do not bar "the enforce-
ment of agreements to perform future employment-related actions such as the
employee's agreement to retire or otherwise terminate employment at a future
date.""2 2 Thus, through this exception, employers have an opportunity to
protect themselves against future claims that may stem from compulsory
retirement policies.
In the context of a law firm, waiver of ADEA claims could occur when
the firm admits an individual to the partnership. As part of the partnership
agreement, the firm could require the prospective partner to sign a waiver
agreeing to retire at a specified age and releasing the firm from all ADEA
claims related to its retirement policies. As a result, an individual's status at
the time of mandatory retirement would matter less because the firm could
argue that the waiver absolves it from liability. However, the Supreme Court
has cautioned that such a waiver must satisfy all specified requirements of the
OWBPA.2 s3 Specifically, the firm must ensure that the waiver is "knowing
and voluntary. 2 54  The OWBPA provides a number of conditions that a
waiver must satisfy in order to meet the "knowing and voluntary" standard.
255
If the waiver does not meet all of these conditions, it is voidable by the
individual who signed it.256
A carefully drafted waiver provision placed in a partnership agreement
could therefore give firms assurance that prospective partners cannot bring
successful claims against them following retirement. This is also consistent
with the revised guidelines' focus on the intent of the parties "as expressed in
written agreement or contracts. 257 It is understandable that firms may want
to avoid the chilling effect that these waiver provisions could have on camara-
derie and morale within the organization. However, the limited liability
regime within which most firms currently operate may already have similar
waiver of rights that may arise in future).
252. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(cX2) (2001).
253. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1998) (noting that
statutory command of OWBPA clearly mandates satisfaction of all requirements).
254. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (1994) (providing
minimum requirements in order for waiver to be knowing and voluntary).
255. See id. (listing requirements such as forty-five day deliberation period for waiver in
connection with exit incentive or other employment termination programs). The employer must
also ensure that "the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual is already entitled." Id. § 626(t)(1)(D).
256. See Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chem., Inc. 11 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding that waivers that fail to meet all requirements of OWBPA are voidable).
257. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § (AXIXd) (May 12,2000).
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ramifications,25 arguably making any effect waiver agreements might have on
the dynamic of most firms negligible.
Furthermore, firms could minimize the harshness of waiver agreements
by drafting them in similar fashion to early retirement incentive plans
(ERIPs).2"9 Under this scenario, prospective partners would come away with
tangible advantages that go beyond typical retirement benefits." ° Firms
would have a great deal of leeway in determining what type of advantages to
offer prospective partners to offset the effects of forced retirement. In addi-
tion, firms could allow individuals who choose not to sign waiver agreements
the option of staying with the firm in employee positions such as "of
counsel," 26 with full with retention of ADEA rights. This would make
waivers appear less like a coercive forfeiture of rights and more like a
bargained-for exchange between the parties. Finn retirement policies would
then take on both mandatory and voluntary components. They are mandatory
in the sense that the waivers are prerequisites for admission to the partnership,
but voluntary in the sense that individuals need not make an all-or-nothing
choice between signing the waiver and leaving the firm altogether. More
importantly, the voluntary element of these arrangements permits them to pass
muster under the OWBPA.
262
Although an increase in retirement benefits to partners will certainly cost
finns money, it averts the expense and negative publicity of age discrimina-
tion suits. Additionally, the partnership can continue to reap the substantial
fiscal rewards of having fewer and younger partners. Thus, both parties can
exit the relationship amicably through the compromises they have made.263
258. See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 393,408 (1998) (discussing concern that removal of vicarious liability threat
in firms reduces incentives to create "extensive monitoring and mentoring systems"). To put
it another way, modem firms may already act in a less "team-oriented" paradigm than they did
in the past
259. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(BXii) (1994)
(allowing employer to implement voluntary early retirement incentive plan if it is consistent
with ADEA); see generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Age Discrimination Realty Age Discrimina-
tion?: TheADEA's UnnaturalSolution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780,814-15 (1997) (discussing use
of ERIPs to counteract general ADEA prohibition on mandatory retirement).
260. See id. at 814 (characterizing typical ERIPs as one-time lump sum payments inducing
older workers to retire early).
261. See Johnson & Coyle, supra note 153, at 369-72 (characterizing "of counsel" and
non-equity partner positions as ones with no equity stake in firm but with job stability).
262. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text (explaining "knowing and voluntary"
requirement for ADEA waivers of rights).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62 (discussing conciliatory nature of
proposed waiver agreements).
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The preceding recommendations are neither firms' only options nor
absolute guarantees against employer liability. However, as long as employ-
ers properly follow the OWBPA waiver requirements, they can confidently
assume that traditional common-law contract defenses will not deem the
agreements voidable.2" Moreover, these recommendations represent ways in
which firms can reassess their current policies and decide whether protective
measures are right for them.
VII. Conclusion
As law firms and other professional organizations persistently grow in
size and stature, it is likely that they will continue to face dilemmas associated
with an increasingly older yet productive American workforce.2" Both the
lower federal courts and the EEOC are demonstrating a heightened awareness
of this reality, as well as a readiness to view the legal rights of purported
partners more flexibly.. The EEOC currently is investigating the policies of
one major law firm in Chicago2" and has won an action in federal court to
compel partial compliance with a subpoena requesting firm information and
documents relevant to the issue of ADEA coverage.26
In light of all of this, firms should view the revised EEOC guidelines
with both caution and acceptance.' By reflecting on what effect the guide-
lines may have on their policies, firms can choose which approaches effec-
tively balance liability and internal relations concerns.269 Prospective partners
should use the guidelines to educate themselves on what rights they may
forfeit and retain by entering the partnership, as well as how the EEOC and
264. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998) (explaining that
independent regime set up by OWBPA for assessing ADEA waivers forecloses general contract
defenses).
265. See Haguewood, supra note 14, at 429 (noting companies' responses to increased
ability of older Americans to remain productive members of workforce).
266. See Martha Neil, Over the Hill, Out the Door?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 20,20 (sum-
marizing EEOC investigation of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP after it demoted thirty-two
older partners to "counsel" or "senior counsel" status and lowered firm's mandatory retirement
age).
267. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, No. 02-1605, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22152,
at *30 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that enough doubt existed regarding whether demoted
individuals were covered by age discrimination law to warrant partial compliance with sub-
poena).
268. See supra Part liA (discussing significance and ramifications of revised EEOC
guidelines).
269. See supra Part VI (offering recommendations for minimizing liability while avoiding
negative side effects on firm dynamics).
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courts may respond to attempts to vindicate those rights.2"' Finally, although
courts now have a sound means of quantifying status determinations,271 they
should approach this new framework thoughtfully. In particular, courts
should resolve the ambiguity regarding the EEOC's emphasis on "control.
272
Courts should specifically place the focus on physical control by the organiza-
tion over the individual rather than control in the abstract sense, thereby
appropriately narrowing the breadth of the revised guidelines.273 This type of
initiative is not beyond the capacity of courts, due to the generally persuasive
yet non-binding nature of EEOC guidelines. 2 4
270. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (commcnting on changing structure
of modem firms).
271. See supra Part IV.B (characterizing EEOC guidelines as persuasive authority deserv-
ing measurable judicial deference).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74 (discussing revised guidelines' failure to
clarify what type of control is relevant in determining employee/partner status).
273. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that guidelines potentially place
almost anyone in partnership setting within provisions of ADEA).
274. See supra Part IV.B (characterizing EEOC guidelines as having persuasive authority
but not carrying force of law).
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